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NOT A PRAYER FOR CURRICULAR
REFORM AFTER LEE V. WEISMAN
Joanne C. Brant*

Our task, as participants in this Symposium, is to consider the
implications of Lee v. Weisman' for future free exercise challenges
to public school curricula. Professor Dent suggests that Weisman
may offer some good news for free exercise challenges to curricula, because the Supreme Court has demonstrated its sensitivity to
compulsion in the public school arena. He argues that if the Court
is willing to recognize the coercive impact of a brief, nondenominational prayer at a middle school graduation ceremony that students are not required to attend, then they must surely recognize
the coercive impact- of a mandatory curriculum that degrades or
otherwise offends a student's religious beliefs.
His argument is logically persuasive. Unfortunately, the force
of logic plays a limited role in the jurisprudence of the Religion
Clauses.
Professor Dent's argument is ultimately not persuasive, quite
simply, because Employment Division v. Smith2 leaves him no
room. In Smith, the Court rejected a free exercise challenge to
Oregon's narcotics laws, which had the effect of criminalizing the
consumption of peyote as part of a religious communion ceremony.3 The coercive effect of the Oregon statute upon the religious
freedom of the plaintiffs was pellucidly clear. It is difficult to
argue that a criminal sanction on a religious communion ceremony
is less coercive than the forced exposure of students in classrooms

* Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University College of Law; A.B., 1983
Cornell University; LD., 1986 Case Western Reserve University. I would like to thank
Jonathan Entin, Bill Marshall and the Case Western Reserve Law Review for the opportunity to participate in this symposium.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
2. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that workers who were fired for using peyote in
religious ceremony were not entitled to unemployment compensation).
3. Id. at 890.
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to books and ideas that conflict with their religious beliefs. Yet
that is the argument Professor Dent must make in order to contend
that plaintiffs who wish to challenge curricular decisions are likely
to succeed where the Smith plaintiffs failed.
Even more importantly, the facts of Smith present a formidable challenge to Professor Dent's use of the belief/conduct dichotomy. 4 Smith tells us that the act of taking communion, perhaps the
supreme physical expression of belief, can be prohibited by any
neutral law of general application.5 Given this for a starting point
it is an uphill struggle to find, as Professor Dent does, that public
school instruction is more akin to protected belief than it is to
conduct, because instruction in doctrine interferes with the "preservation and transmission" of religious belief.6 Smith preserves the
rhetoric of a belief/conduct dichotomy, but leaves so little on the
"belief" side of the line that it is unlikely the distinction will prove
valuable to free exercise claimants. The belief/conduct issue is too
peripheral in Weisman for any incidental comments in that case to
presage a genuine expansion of what the Court is prepared to
recognize as protected belief.7

4. It is often asserted that the Free Exercise Clause affords absolute protection to religious beliefs, but only qualified protection to conduct based upon religious beliefs. See,
e.g., id. at 876-81 (differentiating between the complete protection afforded to religious
beliefs and protections given the exercise of religion); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699
(1986) (affording less protection to the exercise than the belief); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963) (distinguishing between freedom of individual conduct and freedom of individual belief); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (also distinguishing conduct and beliefs).
5. Justice Scalia refused to consider the importance of peyote ingestion to members of
the Native American Church, stating that judicial determinations of the "importance" or
"centrality" of the conduct that the state sought to regulate were inappropriate. Smith, 494
U.S. at 886-89.
6. George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of Public
School Students, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 706, 717 (1993) (quoting Lee v. Weisman,
112 S.Ct. 2649, 2656-57 (1992)).
7. Professor Dent relies upon a statement by the Supreme Court in Weisman:
"[P]reservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a
choice committed to the private sphere." Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656-57
(1992). Dent claims that this language indicates the Court is prepared to recognize a
broader definition for "belief" than had previously been afforded. See Dent, supra note 6,
at 716.
The problem with this argument is, once again, the Smith decision, which made clear
that even if worship is "committed to the public sphere," worshippers are not immunized
from regulation under neutral laws of general application. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79. I
find it unlikely that instruction in doctrine, even wrapped in the protective armor of
"preservation and transmission of beliefs" is likely to obtain more protective treatment
from the Court than did the religious worship ceremony of the Native American Church.

RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Professor Dent goes on to suggest that, after Weisman, the
Court will be more concerned about coercion that occurs in public
school settings than about coercive pressure applied by the state to
adults.3 Dent illustrates the significance of a public school setting
through a comparison of Weisman and Marsh v. Chambers,9 in
which the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the
use of a chaplain who opened legislative sessions with a nondenominational prayer. Professor Dent suggests that the difference in
results between Chambers and Weisman indicates the Court's
heightened sensitivity to coercion in the public school context.' °
As Dent points out, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Weisman
distinguished Chambers on the ground that adults were not coerced
by the prayer; they were free to enter and leave the legislative
session at any time." Kennedy also noted that there was no pressure upon legislators to participate, either by their conduct or
through silence and a respectful posture. 2 Unfortunately, this argument again fails to take account of Smith, which the lower federal courts have not hesitated to apply in public school settings.
In Vandiver v. Hardin County Board of Education,3 the
Sixth Circuit applied Smith to the free exercise claim of a high
school student who had completed one year of a religious home
study program and was required to complete equivalency tests in
order to obtain school credit for his home study program. The
court found that the school's policies on testing and academic
standing were valid, neutral laws of general application within the
meaning of Smith. 4 As a result, the plaintiff's free exercise claim
was doomed to fail. It could have been resurrected only if the
plaintiff had been able to establish the violation of another constitutional right in addition to his free exercise claim, and thus present a "hybrid" claim as recognized by Smith.'5 Since the student
in Vandiver was unable to establish that the school's policy burdened other constitutionally protected rights, his free exercise claim

8. See Dent, supra note 6, at 718 (noting the impact of strong pressures placed on
children in the public school setting).
9. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).

10. See Dent, supra note 6, at 716-17 (describing how the Chambers case highlights
the weaker pressures on adults to participate in prayers in the legislature).
11.

Weisman, 112 S. CL at 2658.

12. Id
13. 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991).

14. Id at 932.
15. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
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was denied.16
Vandiver runs counter to many of the inferences Professor
Dent would have us draw from Weisman. Yet the case presents a
rather straightforward application of the principles set forth in
Smith. Dent raises the possibility that free exercise challenges to
curricula could be presented as "hybrid" claims based on a parent's
right to direct the education of their children17 - a right the Supreme Court did reaffirm in the Smith decision.18 However, as
Dent has acknowledged, this cryptic reference may be no more
than shorthand for the rights established by Pierce v. Society of
Sisters9 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.2' As such, it may not be an
"independent" constitutional right at all, but only an indication of
the Court's continued willingness to afford religious children the'
right to withdraw completely from the public school system.2 ' The
right to withdraw completely does not necessarily encompass the
right to be exempted from particular curricular offerings, as the
latter practice is more difficult for public schools to accommodate.
The Supreme Court is currently considering a case that may
clarify the scope of Smith and provide more guidance than
Weisman to the future of free exercise curricula challenges. On
November 4, 1992, the Court heard oral arguments involving a free
exercise challenge to four ordinances adopted by the City of
Hialeah, Florida.22 The ordinances, taken together, prohibit the
religious sacrifice of animals.' The plaintiffs are practitioners of
the Santeria religion, which originated in Africa over four thousand
years ago and was carried to the Caribbean by slaves, and to the
United States by Cuban refugees.24
At first glance, it is not readily apparent how an animal sacrifice case is likely to affect the rights of religious parents who seek

16. Vandiver, 925 F.2d at 933.
17. See Dent, supra note 6, at 715.
18. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (asserting it is "the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction
with other constitutional protections" which provides the foundation for a valid challenge
to a neutral law).
19. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down state law requiring parents to send children to
public schools).
20. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking down compulsory attendance laws as applied to
Amish students over 16).
21. See Dent, supra note 6, at 714.
22. Petitioners Brief at 6,,Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (No. 91-948).
23. HIAIEAH, FLA., ORDINANCEs §§ 87-40, -52, -71, -72 (1987).
24. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Lukumi Babalu (No. 91-948).
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exemptions or accommodations from offensive elements of a public
school curriculum. Yet the case, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah,7 presents at least two issues whose resolution is critical to curricular decisions.
The first issue is what counts as a neutral, generally applicable
law under Smith. In his brief for the plaintiffs, Douglas Laycock
argues that this is now the single most important issue in Free
Exercise Clause analysis. 26 His argument is that a law is not neutral if it: (1) singles out religion for special regulation, or is enacted for anti-religious motives; (2) has the dominant effect of
suppressing religious exercise, or (3) if it penalizes religiously
motivated but not secularly driven conduct.27
The City of Hialeah, on the other hand, contends that their
ordinances are neutral laws of general application because those
laws have a secular purpose that the State is free to regulate (i.e.,
prohibiting cruelty to animals and ,promoting public health) and
because the laws apply neutrally to all members of society. 28 The
City contends that if a law meets these requirements, it may affect
religious exercise without triggering stricter scrutiny of the law's
purpose and fit.29
The Supreme Court's resolution of this question is critical to
curricular decisions, for it will determine the scope of Smith. Is a
school board's decision to require all students to read a particular
book a neutral, generally applicable rule? What if the school board
adopts its rule in order to revoke a prior policy of accommodating
parents by permitting their children to read alternative, non-offensive texts? The Lukumi Babalu case may help us answer these
questions.
The second issue that Lukumi Babalu may resolve, or at least
shed some light upon, is the nature of a compelling state interest
that is sufficient to defeat a free exercise right. Both the district
court and the court of appeals decided that the City's ordinances
did not violate free exercise because the City's interests in zoning,
public health and preventing cruelty to animals were sufficient to

25. 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989). The opinion of the Court of Appeals is unreported. See Petitioner's Brief at 6, Lukumi Babalu (No. 91-948).
26. Petitioner's Brief at 11.
27. l
28. Respondent's Brief at 45-46, Lukumi Babalu (No. 91-948).
29. L
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satisfy that standard. 3' Laycock has argued that more must be
shown than simply that a regulation falls within a state's police
power.3 ' Resolution of this issue will directly affect cases involving curricular decisions.
For example, what interests would a school board need to
demonstrate in a curricular case to prevail under the compelling
state interest standard? May the state invoke its general interest in
education, or must it show a compelling interest in the specific
part of the curriculum that is the subject of the free exercise challenge? What level of specificity is needed, and what sort of interests is the Court prepared to recognize as compelling? 32 By determining whether the City of Hialeah's interest in promoting public
health and preventing cruelty to animals amounts to a compelling
interest sufficient to support the ordinances, the Court may help us
answer these questions.
Professor Dent has argued that the government has a compelling interest in education only insofar as education is needed to
avoid indigent citizens.33 This proposition is difficult to accept.
The compulsory education laws of most states recognize that public
schools perform a more important function than merely reducing
the incidence of indigency and illiteracy? 4 And therein lies the
heart of most free exercise challenges to public school curricula.
The public schools are a pivotal source of instruction in fundamental values. What those values are, or more importantly, what
they should be, remains a source of great division. But most of the
courts and legislatures that have considered the question agree that
these values include, at a minimum, teaching the importance of
civic rights and liberties, and promoting tolerance for diverse backgrounds, viewpoints and religious traditions.35 These values are
30. Petitioner's Brief at 8, Lukumi Babalu (No. 91-948).
31. Id at 8, 22-24.

32. Levels of generality in constitutional interpretation have received some recent scholarly attention. See generally, Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev.
317 (1992); Frank Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. Ci. L. Rev. 349 (1992).
33. Dent, supra note 6, at 730.
34. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1915 (1993) (including "citizenship training" in the
public school curriculum); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-214 (1991) (requiring teachers to emphasize "honesty, morality, courtesy, obedience to law, respect for the national flag, the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Nebraska, respect for
parents and the home, the dignity and necessity of honest labor, and other lessons of a
steadying influence which tend to promote and develop an upright and desirable citizenry"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1007 (1986 Supp.) (including a "positive values" education requirement).
35. See, e.g., cases discussing the importance of tolerance of divergent political views:
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widely deemed essential to harmony in a pluralistic society. Free
exercise challenges that oppose these fundamental values are particularly difficult for the courts.
One such case, decided by the Sixth Circuit in 1987, was
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education.36 The plaintiffs in
that case challenged the schools' use of a basal reader published
by Holt, Rhinehart and' Winston.37 Two particular stories from the
readers that were offensive to the plaintiffs may be illustrative.
In one story, entitled "A Visit to Mars", thought transfer and
telepathy are portrayed.38 The parents in Mozert found this story
offensive because they felt it depicted "futuristic supernaturalism"
and sent a message to children that telepathy can be viewed as a
scientific concept.39 Another passage that the plaintiffs found objectionable as futuristic supernaturalism described Leonardo de
Vinci as a creative individual whose art "came closest to the divine
"4
touch. 0
In The Diary of Anne Frank,Anne explained her idea of what
religion means to her friend Peter Van Doan, saying "I don't mean
you have to be Orthodox... or believe in heaven and hell and
purgatory and things... I just mean some religion.., it doesn't
matter what. Just to believe in something"4 1 Read as a whole,
plaintiffs objected to the fact that this passage encourages tolerance
for religious diversity.42
I offer these examples not in a spirit of ridicule or criticism,
for I have no doubt that these texts were deeply offensive to the
plaintiffs, and that their religious beliefs were sincerely held. I offer these examples to illustrate the difficulty for school boards and
textbook editors in identifying texts that are likely to give offense,
and to show the breadth of the possible exemptions that could be
required. The court in Mozert found that the plaintiffs had failed to

Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30
(1973); Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 669-70 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Mozert v.
Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1068 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied., 484
U.S. 1066 (1988).
36. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
37. AL. at 1059-60.
38. Id. at 1062.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. JOAN DELFATTORE, WHAT JOHNNY SHOULDN'T READ 33 (Yale 1992).

42. Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 582 F. Supp. 201, 202 (1984).
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show that exposure to these and other stones burdened the free
exercise of their religion, and therefore found that the school board
had no constitutional obligation to accommodate the plaintiffs.43
Weisman is likely to be criticized by those who consider the
current Court to be "unduly protective" of the Establishment Clause
at the expense of free exercise.' Numerous examples of Establishment Clause jurisprudence4 5 could be offered to lend support
to the claim that the judiciary has been zealous in its efforts to
keep religion out of public schools. I suggest that if the Court
were to recognize, as I do not believe it will, free exercise challenges to curricula like those presented in Mozert, the resulting
burden on public education would make the current burdens nposed by a strict reading of the Establishment Clause pale in comparison.

43. Id. at 1070.
44. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 864, (1988); Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion, 41 CAmH. U. L. REV. 19 (1991); Richard S. Myers, Curriculum in the Public
Schools: The Need for an Emphasis on Parental Control, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 431
(1990).
45. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per cunam); Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); School Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

